Exploiting iOS 11.0-11.3.1 Multi-path-TCP:A walk through


by Ian Fang @fongtinyik, Qoobee @Qooobeee

Introduction

The iOS 11 mptcp bug (CVE-2018-4241) discovered by Ian Beer is a serious kernel vulnerability which involves a buffer overflow in mptcp_usr_connectx that allows attackers to execute arbitrary code in a privileged context.

Ian Beer attached an interesting piece of PoC code which demonstrated a rather elegant technique to obtain the kernel task port with this vulnerability. Extending on his brief writeup that comes with the PoC, this blog post will mainly aim at walking through the PoC in great details as well as covering its background. If you are an iOS security researcher who hasn’t looked into the PoC source code yet, hopefully you will find the materials handy when you decide to do so.

Please have a copy of mptcp PoC code before we dive in! You can download it from here: Download

Note: All credits for exploitation techniques, vulnerability PoC code and original writeup belong to Ian Beer at Google Project Zero.

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New Vehicle Security Research by KeenLab: Experimental Security Assessment of BMW Cars


by Tencent Keen Security Lab

Introduction

The research of BMW cars is an ethical hacking research project. In the research, Keen Security Lab performed an in-depth and comprehensive analysis of both hardware and software on in-vehicle infotainment Head Unit, Telematics Control Unit and Central Gateway Module of multiple BMW vehicles. Through mainly focusing on various external attack surfaces, (including GSM network, BMW Remote Service, BMW ConnectedDrive System, Remote Diagnosis, NGTP protocol, Bluetooth protocol, USB and OBD-II interfaces), Keen Security Lab has gained local and remote access to infotainment components, T-Box components and UDS communication above certain speed of selected multiple BMW vehicle modules and been able to gain control of the CAN buses with the execution of arbitrary, unauthorized diagnostic requests of BMW in-car systems remotely.

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TenSec 2018


by KeenLab

TenSec is an annual security conference held by Tencent Keen Security Lab, focusing on cutting-edge security research of mainstream PC/Mobile operating systems, applications, cloud computing technologies, IOT smart devices etc. This year, TenSec will be held on Oct 10th-11th in Shenzhen, China. We will start inviting speakers soon. More information will be released through this post.

A bunch of Red Pills: VMware Escapes


by Marco Grassi, Azureyang, Jackyxty

Background

VMware is one of the leaders in virtualization nowadays. They offer VMware ESXi for cloud, and VMware Workstation and Fusion for Desktops (Windows, Linux, macOS).
The technology is very well known to the public: it allows users to run unmodified guest “virtual machines”.
Often those virtual machines are not trusted, and they must be isolated.
VMware goes to a great deal to offer this isolation, especially on the ESXi product where virtual machines of different actors can potentially run on the same hardware. So a strong isolation of is paramount importance.

Recently at Pwn2Own the “Virtualization” category was introduced, and VMware was among the targets since Pwn2Own 2016.

In 2017 we successfully demonstrated a VMware escape from a guest to the host from a unprivileged account, resulting in executing code on the host, breaking out of the virtual machine.

If you escape your virtual machine environment then all isolation assurances are lost, since you are running code on the host, which controls the guests.

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New Car Hacking Research: 2017, Remote Attack Tesla Motors Again


by Keen Security Lab of Tencent

Keen Lab discovered new security vulnerabilities on Tesla motors and realized full attack chain to implement arbitrary CAN BUS and ECUs remote controls on Tesla motors with latest firmware.

Several highlights for 2017 Tesla Research:

  • Realized full attack chain as we did in year 2016 to implement arbitrary CAN BUS and ECUs remote controls.
  • Discovered multiple 0Days in different modules. Currently, Keen Lab is working with Tesla and related manufactures on assigning CVE number of the vulnerabilities.
  • Tesla implemented a new security mechanism “code signing” to do signature integrity check of system firmware that will be FOTAed to Tesla motors in Sept 2016. The code signing was bypassed by Keen Lab.
  • The “Group lighting show of Model X” in our demonstration is technically arbitrary remote controls on multiple ECUs at the same time. It shows Keen Lab’s research capability on CAN BUS and ECUs.

Keen Lab has followed “responsible disclosure” process to reported all security vulnerabilities and related exploitations to Tesla. Tesla Product Security Team has verified and confirmed all the bugs in our report. Security patches have been made and updated to motors via FOTA efficiently in July. The reported issues affect multiple models of Tesla motors. Based on Tesla’s report, most of the active Tesla motors have been updated to new firmware with patches via FOTA. We appreciate Tesla Product Security Team for their quick response, quick fix and efficient patching via FOTA.

Reminder to Tesla car owners: Please check if your car is with the firmware version 8.1 (17.26.0) or later. If NOT, please upgrade to the latest firmware to ensure all the issues are fixed.

The video below demonstrates the impact of our remote attack vector. REMINDER: WHAT YOU ARE ABOUT TO SEE IN THIS VIDEO ARE PERFORMED BY PROFESSIONAL RESEARCHERS, DO NOT TRY THIS AT HOME. Appreciate Tencent Auto for the contributions on publishing this demonstration.

Racing for everyone: descriptor describes TOCTOU in Apple's core


by Qidan He (@flanker_hqd)

This blog post is about a new type of vulnerabilities in IOKit I discovered and submitted to Apple in 2016. I did a brief scan using a IDA script on MacOS and found at least four bugs with 3 CVEs assigned (CVE-2016-7620/4/5), see https://support.apple.com/kb/HT207423. I was told afterwards that there’re even more issues of this type on iOS’/OSX’s IOKit drivers and fortunately Apple fixed them also.

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A Link to System Privilege


by Daniel King (@long123king)

A Detailed Description of CVE-2016-0176 and Its Exploitation

Essentials of a Successful Pwn of Microsoft Edge

A successful Pwn of Microsoft Edge consists of two essential parts: Browser RCE(Remote Code Execution) and browser sandbox bypass. Browser RCE is typically achieved by exploiting a Javascript vulnerability, while browser sandbox bypass can be achieved in different ways, logical sandbox escape or EoP(Escalation of Privilege) through kernel vulnerabilities.

Sandbox of Microsoft Edge is built upon the access check mechanism. In Windows operating system, resources are shared in system-wide range, for example, a file or device can be shared across different processes. Some resources contain sensitive informations, some others are critical to the whole system’s well-functioning, corruptions of those resources will crash the whole system. For those reasons, there should be strict checks when a process want to access a specific resource, this is called access check. When a resource is opened, token of the subject process will be checked against security descriptor of the object resource. Access check consists of several elementary checks in different dimensions, such as ownership and group membership check, privileges check, integrity level and trust level check, capabilities check, etc. The previous generation sandbox is based on integrity level check, where the sandboxed application runs in low integrity level, thus it can not access resources protected by medium or higher integrity level. Microsoft Edge adopts new generation sandbox based on AppContainer, where additional capabilities check will be conducted when accessing resources, besides basic integrity level check. For more details about access check mechanism, refer to my talk at ZeroNights 2015: Did You Get Your Token?

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Car Hacking Research: Remote Attack Tesla Motors


by Keen Security Lab of Tencent

With several months of in-depth research on Tesla Cars, we have discovered multiple security vulnerabilities and successfully implemented remote, aka none physical contact, control on Tesla Model S in both Parking and Driving Mode. It is worth to note that we used an unmodified car with latest firmware to demonstrate the attack.

Following the global industry practice on “responsible disclosure” of product security vulnerabilities, we have reported the technical details of all the vulnerabilities discovered in the research to Tesla. The vulnerabilities have been confirmed by Tesla Product Security Team.

Keen Security Lab appreciates the proactive attitude and efforts of Tesla Security Team, leading by Chris Evans, on responding our vulnerability report and taking actions to fix the issues efficiently. Keen Security Lab is coordinating with Tesla on issue fixing to ensure the driving safety of Tesla users.

As far as we know, this is the first case of remote attack which compromises CAN Bus to achieve remote controls on Tesla cars. We have verified the attack vector on multiple varieties of Tesla Model S. It is reasonable to assume that other Tesla models are affected. Keen Security Lab would like to send out this reminder to all Tesla car owners:

PLEASE DO UPDATE THE FIRMWARE OF YOUR TESLA CAR TO THE LATEST VERSION TO ENSURE THAT THE ISSUES ARE FIXED AND AVOID POTENTIAL DRIVING SAFETY RISKS.

The video below demonstrates the impact of our remote attack vector. REMINDER: WHAT YOU ARE ABOUT TO SEE IN THIS VIDEO ARE PERFORMED BY PROFESSIONAL RESEARCHERS, DO NOT TRY THIS AT HOME.

The Journey of a complete OSX privilege escalation with a single vulnerability - Part 1


by Qidan He (@flanker_hqd)

In previous blog posts Liang talked about the userspace privilege escalation vulnerability we found in WindowServer. Now in following articles I will talk about the Blitzard kernel bug we used in this year’s pwn2own to escape the Safari renderer sandbox, existing in the blit operation of graphics pipeline. From a exploiter’s prospective we took advantage of an vector out-of-bound access which under carefully prepared memory situations will lead to write-anywhere-but-value-restricted to achieve both infoleak and RIP control. In this article we will introduce the exploitation methods we played with mainly in kalloc.48 and kalloc.4096.

First we will first introduce the very function which the overflow occurs, what we can control and how these affect our following exploitation.

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WindowServer: The privilege chameleon on macOS (Part 2)


by Liang Chen (@chenliang0817)

From my last blog post “WindowServer: The privilege chameleon on macOS (Part 1)”, we discussed some basic concepts, the history and architecture of WindowServer, as well as the details of CVE-2016-1804 - A Use-After-Free (Or we can also call it double free) bug with very small time window. Several troubles still exist before we can write the exploit code of this bug, now let’s resolve them one by one.

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